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Using a database of Chinese firms, we examine the effects of technology 
spillovers not only between foreign entrants and local firms but also 
between “modernized” local firms to other local firms. Our results show 
that the increased presence of foreign multinationals within industries and 
in their upstream sectors positively affected the productivity of local firms.   
The positive intra-industry spillover effect from wholly owned subsidiaries 
becomes evident when the Chinese government’s restriction on foreign 
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 Promoting FDI has always been a primary concern for policy makers, especially in 
developing countries. FDI is expected to force local firms to improve their technical 
efficiency, and local firms can benefit from technology spillovers from foreign entrants. The 
Chinese government, for instance, has encouraged FDI in order to prop up backward 
industries. A large literature on the host country effects of FDI has been borne out of such 
policy concerns. Previous literature on spillovers mainly examined the relationship between 
the productivity of domestic firms and share of foreign-owned subsidiaries in each industry. 
Most of earlier industry-level studies, using cross-section data (e.g. Caves, 1974; Blömstrom, 
1986), have confirmed presence of positive spillovers from FDI.   
Yet the empirical findings on spillover effects are mixed. Some studies have provided 
evidence for positive spillover effects (Hejazi and Safarian, 1999; Javorcik, 2004; Keller, 
2002; Liu, Siler, Wang, and Wei, 2000). Others have indicated the opposite (Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999; Konings, 2001), or found spillover effects to be confined to other 
multinationals (Feinberg and Majumdar, 2001). Moreover, some contend that foreign firms 
constitute a sufficient competitive threat that they might dampen profit margins of local firms 
and eventually “crowd out” them (Blomstrom, Kokko, and Zejan, 2000; Caves, 1996; De 
Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003). 
A seminal work by Aitken and Harrison (1999) rebut the previous industry-level 
studies pointing out that previous works are flawed with serious identification problem: FDI 
gravitates towards more productive industries, and then the observed positive correlation will 
overstate the positive impact of FDI.
1 Controlling for “fixed” differences in productivity 
levels across industries using  a plant-level panel data on over 4,000 Venezuelan firms, 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that foreign equity participation is positively correlated with 
                                                       
1  Regarding the identification problem, positive spillovers in previous industry-level studies may result from 
the fact that FDI forces the exit of less productive domestic firms, and that the market share of multinational 
firms who are, on average, more productive increases.   
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 plant productivity (the “own-plant” effect), but this relation is only robust for small firms. 
However, since the share of foreign firms in certain industry negatively affects the 
productivity of wholly domestically owned plants in the same industry, the net impact of FDI, 
taking into account these two offsetting effects, is quite small. Konings (2001), again with 
firm-level data, found that FDI had a negative impact on local firms’ productivity in Bulgaria 
and Romania. 
Later, Keller and Yeaple (2004) find positive spillovers to U.S. manufacturing firms 
via not only FDI but also via imports even after controlling for the industry fixed effect. They 
argue that the positive spillovers in their studies result from (i) using better data (especially 
measurement of FDI); (ii) using samples mostly comprising of high-technology firms; and 
(iii) improvement in estimating total factor productivity (TFP) by using the Olley-Pakes 
method. They conjecture that their results are likely to generalize to other countries and 
periods. Another study using the plant-level data from UK by Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter 
(2004) also find a significantly positive correlation between a domestic plant’s TFP and the 
foreign-affiliate share of activity in that plant’s industry. These results suggest that absorptive 
capacity of host country is necessary for positive spillovers from FDI since these two studies 
show evidences from developed countries while negative evidences from Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) are from developing country.   
  In this paper, we build upon the FDI spillover literature and expand it by considering 
the spillover effects among local firms in addition to the spillover effects from foreign 
entrants to local firms. This study is based on panel data for more than 200,000 firms in 
China from 1998 to 2005. China is the world’s largest emerging market, and has recently 
been the world’s largest recipient of FDI.    During 1998-2005, there were substantial changes 
in the composition of local firms and in the ownership structure of foreign firms.  Our 
empirical findings provide a more complete picture of the spillovers by exploring the 
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 dynamic changes in the composition of both foreign and local firms. 
 
FDI and spillover revisited 
 
While there exists a large literature on the spillover effects of MNEs, scholars have 
not paid a due attention toward particular channels through which spillover takes place. As 
argued by Aitken and Harrison (1999), there are a number of channels through which FDI 
affects productivity of domestic firms. First, spillovers through demonstration effect take 
place when a local firm improves its productivity by simply observing nearby foreign firms 
and copying some technology used by MNE affiliates (Blomström and Kokko, 1996). 
Multinationals’ sheer presence in the domestic markets and the resultant exposure to foreign 
products/technologies can inspire local firms and stimulate them to develop new products and 
processes. This not only helps shorten the trial-and-error process of local firms in their search 
for inventions but also lower the perceived risk of innovating along similar directions for 
local firms since the products and technologies that multinationals bring in have already been 
tested in foreign markets.   
Second, another type of spillovers is the one that function through competition 
between multinationals and local firms. The competition effect, unlike demonstration effect 
which is presumably positive, can be either positive or negative. FDI may toughen the 
competition faced by domestic firms, thereby forcing them to trim their fat and become more 
competitive. On the other hand, increase competition with inward FDI can also reduce 
productivity of domestically owned firms, particularly in the short run (Aitken and Harrison, 
1999). If imperfectly competitive firms have to incur fixed costs of production, a foreign firm 
with lower marginal costs will have an incentive to increase production relative to its 
domestic competitor. In this environment, entering foreign firms producing for the local 
market can steal demand from domestic firms, forcing them to reduce production. As 
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 domestic firms spread their fixed costs over a smaller market, their productivity would fall. 
Sembenelli and Siotis (2002) attempt to disentangle the effects from an increase in the degree 
of competition due to FDI. They find that FDI has a positive long-run effect on the 
profitability from positive spillover, while too severe competition might dampen profits 
margin of domestic firms in the short run. They also find that the positive spillover effects 
(from technology transfer) outweigh the negative effects from severe competition only in 
R&D intensive industries.  Similarly, Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (2003) find that direct 
investment by Japanese auto plants in the US increased the competitive pressures of their 
local suppliers and improved their productivity.  They found little evidence of direct 
technology transfer. 
Third, productivity spillovers may also occur due to labor turnover, by which former 
employees of multinational firms set up their own businesses and adopt some of the 
techniques they were using in the foreign firm (Fosfuri, et al., 2001; Song, et al., 2001). Görg 
and Strobl (2005) pursue empirical research along this line by examining spillovers from 
labor movement. They show that firms which are run by owners that worked for MNEs in the 
same industry immediately prior to opening up their own firm have higher productivity 
growth than other firms. Moreover, if at least some of the knowledge particular to foreign 
affiliates is embodied in their labor force, then as affiliate employees leave to work for 
domestic firms, this knowledge which need not be firm-specific (e.g., inventory-control or 
management techniques) may move as well.   
Full versus partial ownership 
Recent studies of spillovers from FDI suggest that the degree of foreign ownership is 
an important factor that influences technology diffusion in host countries (Blomström and 
Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2002). There exist several reasons why we expect that the 
higher the degree of foreign ownership share in investment projects, the more sophisticated 
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 and efficient technologies would be transferred from the parent firm, which can create the 
larger scope for spillovers from FDI. First, the degree of foreign ownership is likely to 
influence the incentive of parent firms to transfer intangible assets such as technology and 
management skills to their affiliates. A fully owned affiliate would be most efficient, since the 
parent firm would have no inhibition to transfer its cutting-edge technology to it. By contrast, 
the parent firm would be less willing to transfer efficient technology to a partially owned 
affiliate due to the possibility of misappropriation of its knowledge-based assets by the local 
partner. Moreover, majority foreign ownership results in greater control over profits, which in 
turn provides a greater incentive to transfer technology and management skills to subsidiaries.   
Yet, there are also reasons why productivity spillovers for the local economy could be 
stronger when foreign firms are in minority positions. First, closer contact between foreign 
technology and local skills in minority owned firms might facilitate the transfer of technology 
that is most suitable in the host country environment and thus results in faster diffusion. 
Moreover, local partners’ better knowledge of local conditions regarding factor endowments 
and skill of employees would affect the choice of technology brought in by the multinationals 
and thereby the degree of spillovers since technologies suitable for local conditions will have 
the largest effect on local firms. At the same time, the higher the control of the local partners 
is, the more difficult it will be difficult to monitor their actions. As a consequence, it might be 
easier to appropriate the multinationals’ proprietary knowledge which has public good 
properties 
Indeed, empirical findings are mixed. Using the Indonesian data for 1991, Blomström 
and Sjöholm (1999) find that the degree of foreign ownership does neither affect the level of 
labor productivity in foreign establishments, nor the degree of spillovers.    On the other hand, 
Dimelis and Louri (2002) find with a sample of manufacturing firms in Greece that a positive 
effect of foreign ownership on labor productivity stems from exclusively from full and 
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 majority owned affiliates. They also find that productivity spillovers benefiting local firms 
are also differentiated, with minority foreign holdings exercising a stronger effect especially 
for the local firms with lower productivity. 
Horizontal versus vertical spillovers 
While the spillovers from inward FDI we considered so far are intra-industry 
(horizontal), many scholars recently have put a special emphasis on inter-industry (vertical) 
spillovers (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Markusen and Venables, 1999; Javorcik, 2004; Kugler, 
2005; Blalock and Gertler, 2007). Vertical spillovers flow in two directions of suppliers and 
customers (i.e., backward and forward linkages, respectively) of the firm in consideration. 
Javorcik (2004) argues that spillovers through backward linkages (contacts between 
multinationals and their local suppliers) may take place due to (i) direct knowledge transfer 
from foreign customers to local suppliers; (ii) higher requirements for product quality and on-
time delivery which confer incentives on domestic suppliers to upgrade their production 
management or technology; and (iii) increased demand for intermediate products, which 
allows local suppliers to reap the benefits of scale economies. Similarly, forward linkages 
refer to the degree to which foreign multinationals are present in the upstream sectors, 
supplying parts and intermediate goods, to local firms. She further contends that spillovers 
from FDI are more likely to be vertical than horizontal in nature since multinationals have an 
incentive to prevent information leakage that would enhance the performance of their local 
competitors, but at the same time may benefit from transferring knowledge to their local 
suppliers.  
Indeed, evidences of spillovers of FDI through backward linkages abound. Using a 
firm-level panel data set from Lithuania, Javorcik (2004) finds that positive vertical spillovers 
from FDI take place through backward linkages. As was the case with the earlier firm-level 
studies of developing countries, no evidence of intra-industry spillovers is found. Blalock and 
8 
 Gertler (2007) establish and quantify the welfare enhancing externalities of vertical 
technology transfer from multinationals to local suppliers in Indonesia. Kugler (2005) 
performs estimations based on the Colombian Manufacturing Census, which reveals that both 
technological and linkage externalities from FDI arises between but not within industries. 
Absorptive capacity of local firms 
A critical omission in the current spillover literature is the unilateral treatment of local 
firms as undifferentiated recipients of technology spillovers. So far the differing effects of 
FDI on local firms have mainly been discussed as a result of geographic spacing (Audretsch 
and Feldman, 1996; Keller, 2002) and the technology intensity of industries (Cantwell, 1989; 
Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Kokko, 1994; Kokko et al., 1996). Yet, there are large inter-firm 
variations among local firms in terms of organizational, financial, and human resources. 
Some local firms have developed transferable assets by restructuring, innovating, and 
internationalizing, and they employ these assets to learn from and compete with foreign 
entrants (Dawar and Frost, 1999; Zeng and Williamson, 2003).   
While firms are under great conformity pressures due to tough competition in 
developed countries, there can be a large variance in firm productivity among local firms in 
many emerging markets. For example, in China, large inefficient state owned enterprises may 
continue operating along with nimble privately owned local firms.  Thus, local firms in 
emerging markets may benefit from the presence of FDI to varying degrees, according to 
their efficiency level and to their absorptive capacity. Some “fast learners”, such as the ones 
that emulate foreign firms in their strategy and structure, are likely to absorb foreign 
technology quicker and more completely than conventional firms do since the former has 
been born in a more competitive market, and is more responsive to environmental changes 
than the latter. Those “modernized” or “restructured” local firms, in turn, can serve as a 
medium of technology spillover: they may absorb technology from foreign firms, and then 
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 transfer it to other local firms. Thus, the channel of spillovers can be indirect, from foreign 
firms to some modernized local firms, and from modernized local firms to conventional local 
firms. Conventional local firms can learn from these fast learners more efficiently, through 
various social networks among local firms, than they can do possibly from foreign firms. 
Further, in prior studies, with few exceptions, local firms are assumed to have no 
impact on foreign entrants. Two studies that did report a “reverse spillover” effect on foreign 
entrants are both based on British samples: Driffield and Munday (2000) found that the labor 
productivity of domestic industries had a positive impact on foreign firms; Liu et al. (2000) 
found that the level of FDI was positively influenced by the comparative advantages of 
domestic industries. Moreover, some local firms may possess useful knowledge that can 
benefit foreign entrants. Although it is reasonable to assume that foreign entrants to an 
emerging market generally enjoy a technology advantage over local firms, some local firms 
may serve as a source of local knowledge for foreign firms, by forming joint ventures with 
new entrants and providing a pool of market-oriented managers and workers. Thus, foreign 




FDI in China 
China is the empirical context for this study. It is an ideal location to examine 
spillovers from foreign direct investments. First, it has recently changed from a Communist 
economic regime to a more liberalized market economy. As a consequence, there are many 
local firms with varying degrees of capabilities. Second, the Chinese government has 
encouraged FDI in order to prop up backward industries. There are numerous multinationals 
that operate in a full range of industries in China. Third, the Chinese government encouraged 
foreign multinationals to form joint ventures with local firms as a way to transfer technology.   
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 Such a requirement of involuntary joint ventures was faded out as China prepared itself to 
join the World Trade Organization.  Thus, China provides an interesting setting whether 
technology transfer would be greater under the joint venture regime or under the regime when 
wholly owned subsidiaries were allowed. 
The economic landscape of China started to undergo major changes following the end 
of the Maoist “Cultural Revolution” in the late 1970s. Two major policy initiatives were 
taken at the end of the 1970s: the “Open Door” policy and the “Reform” policy. The “Open 
Door” policy refers to the invitation of inward foreign direct investments to China. In 1980s, 
four “Special Economic Zones” (SEZs) were established in the Southeastern coastal areas, 
followed by the opening of fourteen other coastal cities in 1985. During this period, the most 
popular form of FDI was partially foreign owned joint venture due to both governmental 
restrictions and the practical need for collaboration with a local partner in a largely untapped 
host market.   
The inflow of FDI was briefly interrupted by the Tiananmen Square event in 1989. It 
resumed in 1992 and picked up its pace in the mid 1990s, this time centering Eastern China 
and spreading to the rest of the country. In the process, more and more new FDI entries 
started to take the form of wholly owned subsidiary as the government removed restrictions 
in many industries, and as multinationals accumulated experiences in the Chinese market 
(Vanhonacker, 1997). With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December, 
2001, most such restrictions were lifted. In 2003, China replaced the United States to become 
the largest recipient of FDI in the world.   
The “Reform” policy refers to the transformation of China’s non-market oriented 
state-owned sector to modern organizational forms. The reform began with incentive 
alignment experiments in state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in the late 1970s 
and the 1980s. In the mid-1990s, the Communist government decided to build a “socialist 
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 market economy” by forming a modern corporate system. Reformed SOEs and newly 
established modern firms were incorporated as shareholder or limited liability firms under the 
new Company Law. In the mean time, another type of new firm, private firms, also 
proliferated. Unlike the incorporated firms, which may or may not involve some public 
ownership, private firms lacked political legitimacy in a society heavily influenced by the 
Communist ideological tradition. Despite their popularity among private entrepreneurs and 
their (otherwise) economic vitality, their growth was largely depressed for political reasons 
until 1997, when the ruling Communist Party legitimized this ownership form and claimed it 
to be integral to the “socialist market economy” in the Party’s Fifteenth Congress (ADB 
report). Since then, the number of “incorporated firms” grew rapidly. These include corporati
zed SOEs and firms incorporated since the beginning of the reform, which together with 
private enterprises represent the restructured and “modernized” Chinese firms. 
Data and Sample 
 
The data used in this study are from the annual census surveys of firms conducted by 
the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. Before 1998, the surveys targeted all medium and 
large Chinese firms, administratively defined (namely firms designated to the township level 
or above). Because private firms do not have an associated administrative rank (they had no 
political/legal status at that time), they were not included in these annual surveys. Since 1998, 
the surveys have covered 1) all SOEs, and 2) all non-SOEs, including foreign firms in China 
and domestic private firms, with annual sales of at least RMB 5 million (roughly, $600,000 
US, according to the official 2005 exchange rate) in the previous year. This new criterion 
reflects the government’s acceptance of private firms as an important component of the 
Chinese  economy.    
         Chow  (1993)  confirmed that  the  NBS statistics are largely accurate and internally 
consistent for empirical analysis. For this study, we assembled an eight-year panel (1998-
12 
 2005) by matching yearly data with a unique company ID number, company name, and other 
demographic information contained in the database. There were many cases in which the 
same firms with exactly the same names and the same addresses had different firm identifiers 
in different years because significant changes in ownership, such as joint ventures and 
mergers and acquisitions, occurred. We therefore developed a detailed software algorithm to 
assess whether firms’ demographic information matched with the same firms’ observations 
across years. For each year, 13-22% of the sample firms exited the database due to closure or 
acquisitions, and 14-25% of the firms that appeared in the database were new.
2 The number 
of local firms included in this panel ranged from 123,634 to 196,844, while the number of 
foreign firms ranged from 26,113 to 56,663. In order to measure the vertical linkages, we also 
incorporated the 2002 input-output table from the NBS to calculate the vertical linkage 
variables.    
  Figure 1 and Figure 2 show some clear trends in the composition of local firms and 
foreign firms in our sample. Figure 1 shows the percentages of various types of foreign firms 
by foreign ownership level. In 1998, the ratio of wholly owned operations to joint ventures, 
including majority, equal, and minority ownership, was roughly 40 to 60. Wholly owned 
foreign firms have since increased steadily. By 2005, the ratio has been reversed. Figure 2, on 
the other hand, depicts the percentage of various types of domestic firms by ownership 
category. In 1998, the combined modern sector—incorporated firms and private firms—
constituted less than 20 percent of all firms, while the combined traditional sector—SOEs and 
collectives—accounted for over 80 percent. By 2005, the ratio was also reversed, with private 
firms being the largest winner and accounting for just above 60 percent of the total numbers. 
We believe that these drastic changes in the composition of local firms and the ownership 
                                                       
2  The percentages of firms entered or exited were based on 1998-2003. Between 2003 and 2004, the number of 
firms in the annual survey increased sharply due to the Chinese government’s effort to identify potential tax 
payers. As a consequence, 127,738 firms were added in 2004. 
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 structure of foreign firms provide an ideal setting to examine various contingent factors to 
observe spillover effects.     
_________________________ 




To investigate the impact of foreign presence in the same industry or upstream 
(downstream) sectors on productivity of local firms, we estimate variations of the following 
basic econometric equation: 
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it Y  stands for firm i’s real output at time t, which is the adjusted reported sales, deflated by 
the price index.  ,  capital, is defined as the value of fixed assets at the beginning of the 
year, deflated by the average of the deflators.  ,  employment, is measured by the number 
of employees at time t.  , material inputs, are equal to the value of material inputs 
adjusted for changes in material inventories, deflated by material inputs deflator calculated 
for each sector.    measures the share of foreign capital in firm’s total capital. 
  denotes the extent of foreign presence in the sector and is defined as foreign 
equity participation averaged over all firms in the sector, weighted by each firm’s share in 
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The variable    is a proxy for the foreign presence in the industries that are 
being supplied by the sector to which the firm in question belongs and thus is intended to 
capture the extent of potential contacts between domestic suppliers and multinational 
jt  Backward
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 customers. It is defined in the following way: 
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where  jk α   is the proportion of sector j output supplied to sector k.   
 
The  variable is defined as the weighted share of output in upstream (or 
supplying) sectors produced by firms with foreign capital participation. Following Javorcik 
(2004), we exclude goods produced by foreign affiliates for exports ( ) as only 
intermediates goods sold in the domestic market are relevant to this study. The 
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where  jm σ is the share of inputs purchased by industry j from industry m in total inputs 
sourced by sector j. For the same reason as before, inputs purchased within the sector are 
excluded. 
Scholars have raised several estimation issues regarding the basic specification. As 
pointed out by Haskel et al. (2002), unobserved variables are omitted in the basic 
specification. There are likely to be a number of firm, time and region-specific factors 
unknown to econometrician but known to the firm which may influence the correlation 
between firm productivity and foreign presence. Examples of these variables include high 
quality management in a particular firm or sound infrastructure present in a given region. To 
address this omitted-variable problem, we follow Haskel et al. (2002)’s strategy by using time 
differencing.
3 Of course, the cost of using the time differencing is to lose observations that 
do not show up for two consecutive years. We also include full sets of year, region and 
                                                       
3  In addition to removing any fixed plant-specific unobservable variation, differencing will also remove fixed 
regional and industrial effects such as infrastructure and technological opportunity. Time, industry and regional 
fixed effects on the other hand will control for unobservables that may be driving changes in, for instance, 
attractiveness of a particular region or industry. 
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 industry fixed effects ( j r t and , , α α α ) to control for unobservables that may be driving 
changes in key variables.   
It is important to note that introducing differencing and fixed effects are not enough to 
remove the omitted variable bias completely, if there are important unobservables that vary 
both across plants and over time. Without measures of these plant-and-time-varying factors 
such as managerial talent, estimated productivity may still be biased. Olley and Pakes (1996) 
argue that these remaining unobservable shocks can be proxied from investment behavior, on 
the assumption that it takes time to make investment and that these shocks influence current 
investment but not current output.   
There exist two other important rationales for using the Olley-Pakes approach. It has 
been argued that the use of ordinary least squares may be inappropriate when estimating 
productivity since this method treats labor and other inputs as exogenous variables. Griliches 
and Mairesse (1995) have argued that inputs should be considered endogenous since firm 
chooses them based on its productivity, which is observed by the firm but not by the 
econometrician. Not taking into account the endogeneity of input choices may bias the 
estimated coefficients.  Second, the ordinary least square method does not consider the 
firms’ exit decisions.  As a consequence, the results are subject to surviving firm bias.  
Given that entry and exit are so pervasive in emerging markets such as China, the explicit 
consideration of firms’ exit activities, available in the Olley-Pakes estimation procedure, can 
be crucial. 
In a variant of the above basic econometric equation, we calculate two separate 
horizontal variables,  jt _Partial Horizontal ∆  and  jt _Wholly Horizontal ∆ : one for partially and 
one for fully-owned foreign projects. This is to study how the degree of foreign ownership 
affects spillovers from FDI. Recent paper by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2004b) argue that the 
16 
 ownership structure of FDI may affect the presence of horizontal spillovers in two ways. First, 
fear of technology leakage, especially in countries with limited rule of law, may induce firms 
with most sophisticated technologies to shy away from shared ownership and instead choose 
to invest only in wholly-owned projects. Second, it is generally believed by policy makers in 
developing countries that participation of local capital in a foreign investment project reveals 
the multinational’s proprietary technology and thus facilitates spillovers. The overall 
relationship between the share of foreign ownership and spillovers is the result of these two 
forces and its sign is, therefore, ambiguous. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2004b) find that the 
degree of foreign ownership matters for intra as well as for inter-industry spillovers from FDI. 
They find that positive horizontal spillovers are linked to wholly-owned but not to partially-
owned foreign projects. They also find that the pattern of vertical spillovers is also consistent 
with their expectations. The results point to positive externalities being associated with 
partially-owned foreign projects which are hypothesized to rely more heavily on local 
suppliers. On the other hand, wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries appear to have a negative 
effect on the productivity of domestic firms in upstream sectors 
Our paper has made a number of major differences from Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2004b). First, we have added three variables, jt _Local Horizontal ∆ ,  , 
and  which reflect the presence of “modernized” local firms within the 
same industries and vertical chains, just as we measure foreign firms’ presence. Our 
conjecture is that productivity spillovers may arise from the presence of not only 
multinationals but also modernized local firms that have superior absorptive capacity. Second, 
we include firm-type dummy variables (
jt  ocal Backward_L ∆
jt  ocal ∆Forward_L
f c and , i p , , γ γ γ γ ) to examine whether the firm-type 
matters for the spillover effects. We classify all firms in our sample into five firm-types: state 
owned enterprises, private firms, incorporated firms, collectives, and foreign firms, where 
17 
 state owned enterprises serve as a reference group.   
In light of both omitted-variables and endogeneity issues, we estimate versions of the 
following differenced equation employing the semiparametric estimation procedure 
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996).
 4  
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  Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, and tables 2 and 3 show results only for local 
firms, using the first difference in output and the first difference in total factor productivity by 
the Olley-Pakes method, respectively.  The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that 
backward linkages variable of foreign firms’ presence and backward linkages variable of 
modernized local firms’ presence have a high level of correlations (0.62).  In both tables 2 
and 3, we incorporate modernized local firms’ presence variables sequentially to detect any 
changes in sign when new set of variables are added. 
__________________________ 
Insert Table 1, 2 and 3 over here 
 
The intra-industry foreign firms’ presence variable is positively signed and significant 
in model (1) of table 2, suggesting positive horizontal spillovers from foreign firms to local 
firms.    In model (2), we separate the intra-industry foreign firms’ presence into two-- that of 
wholly owned foreign firms and that of partially owned foreign firms.  The observed 
positive horizontal spillover effects in model (1) seem to come from partially owned foreign 
subsidiaries than from wholly owned subsidiaries. As for possible spillover effects from 
                                                       
4  The details of the procedure are described in the Appendix. 
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 foreign firms’ presence in the vertically related industries, forward linkages, i.e., foreign 
multinationals’ participations in upstream sectors such as supplying parts and intermediate 
goods to local firms, have a positively significant impact on local firms’ productivity.  In 
other words, foreign multinationals’ direct participation in parts and components 
manufacturing has positive spillover effects to downstream sectors since they might have 
transferred key technologies in improving quality and overall performance of important 
components.    On the other hand, the backward linkages, i.e., multinationals’ presence in the 
downstream industries, do not have any significant impact on local firms’ productivity. 
Models (3) and (4) incorporate three additional variables reflecting the presence of 
modernized local firms within industries, and in industries that are vertically related.  In 
models (3) and (4), all three variables turn out to be positively significant, suggesting that the 
higher the shares of modernized local firms (i.e., private firms and incorporated firms) in the 
same industries or in vertically related industries are, the higher the productivity levels of 
local firms are.  Foreign firms’ backward linkage variable, which is insignificant in models 
(1) and (2), turns negatively signed and significant in models (3) and (4), which seem to be 
driven by high correlation with modernized local firms’ backward linkage variable (0.62). 
In models (5)-(8), we divide sample into two time periods, i.e., 1998-2001, and 2002-
2005. With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, most 
restrictions on setting up wholly owned subsidiaries were lifted.  Figure 1 clearly shows a 
trend of sharp increase of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries at the expense of partially 
owned ones.  The presence of partially owned foreign firms is turned out to be significant, 
albeit weakly, in period 1, while the presence of wholly owned subsidiary and the foreign 
firm’s presence in the vertically related sectors have no impact on local firms’ productivity.  
The backward linkage of modernized local firms to other local firms is also weakly positive, 
suggesting some vertical spillovers among local firms.  In period 2, however, horizontal 
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 spillovers from both wholly owned and partially owned subsidiaries turn out to be positively 
significant.    The forward spillovers from foreign to local firms are also positively significant 
in period 2.  All three spillover variables from modernized local firms to other local firms 
turn out to be positively significant, suggesting a strong evidence of spillover effects among 
local firms. 
Table 3 shows results from the Olley-Pakes regressions, where the difference in total 
factor productivity between time t-1 and t is the dependent variable.  The results are quite 
comparable to ones in table 2.  The presence of partially owned foreign firms has weakly 
positive impact on local firms’ productivity in period 1, while both wholly owned and 
partially owned foreign firms are strongly positive in period 2.  Unlike models in table 2, 
forward linkages of foreign firms turn insignificant in all models in table 3.  Spillover 
effects from modernized local firms are positively significant only in period 2. 
Table 4 and 5 shows results using both foreign and local firms.  We have added the 
foreign firms’ ownership share variable to examine whether the increased foreign ownership 
in a firm improves its productivity.   The results in table 4 suggest that the increased foreign 
ownership, e.g., from partially owned to wholly owned subsidiaries, improves the firm 
productivity, especially in period 2, reflecting that foreign multinationals are more willing to 
transfer advanced technology when they can ensure control over the subsidiaries.  The 
foreign firm share variable is not significant in models in table 5, using the difference in total 
factor  productivity.  Other  variables show very similar patterns with those in table 2 and 3. 
Regarding the firm type controls, all private firms, incorporated firms, collectives and 
foreign firms are more productive than state owned enterprises that serve as a reference group.   
Privately owned local firms seem to have the highest level of productivity compared to other 









  This study re-examines the much debated issue of possible spillover effects from 
foreign direct investment.    Our findings differ from previous studies in three important ways.   
First, unlike previous firm level studies in developing countries (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; 
Konings, 2001), we find intra-industry strong positive spillover effects from foreign firms to 
local firms.  Prior to 2001, such intra-industry spillover effects seem present only from 
partially owned foreign subsidiaries. During the period of 2002-05, when the restrictions for 
setting up a wholly owned subsidiary were lifted, such a positive intra-industry spillover can 
be also found from wholly owned subsidiaries.  Yet, the size of coefficient for partially 
owned foreign firms is about twice the size of that for wholly owned foreign firms, 
suggesting that joint venture requirements by the Chinese government in fact achieved its 
strategic goal – transferring technology to backward local industries. 
  Second, unlike prior studies that found positive spillover effects from backward 
linkages, i.e., contact between multinational customers and local suppliers (Javorcik, 2004; 
Javorcik and Spartareanu, 2003), we find that the forward linkages, i.e., multinationals’ direct 
involvement in the upstream sectors, supplying parts and intermediates goods to both foreign 
and local customers, are important sources for spillovers.    When Volkswagen set up its joint 
venture with SAIC (Shanghai Automobile Investment Corporation) in 1984, it promised the 
government to transfer automobile manufacturing technology to Chinese part suppliers and to 
increase local content to 95% by 1995. As a way to achieve the required local content and to 
improve its performance, it urged its suppliers to form joint ventures with Chinese local firms 
and to transfer technology. Strangely, there was no evidence of backward linkages in China. 
  Third, this study might be unique in the sense that we incorporate the possible 
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 spillover effects from “modernized” local firms to other local firms. Chinese local firms 
differ greatly from each other in terms of efficiency level and absorptive capacity.  For 
instance, state owned enterprises did not have abilities or incentives to learn from foreign 
multinationals. We find that the larger the presence of modernized local firms within 
industries and in vertically related industries is, the higher the productivity of local firms is.  
These modernized local firms serve as a medium to absorb technology from foreign entrants 
and they become the sources of spillovers to other local firms. 
  This study employs various methodologies that overcome the limitations of prior 
works.  The time differencing technique resolves the issues of unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and the employment of the Olley-Pakes semi-parametric approach resolves the 
issues of endogeneity and selection bias. With these methodological improvements, we can 
be assured of our somewhat conflicting findings to prior works that observed no horizontal 
spillovers in other emerging economies.  We, however, believe that certainly more work is 
needed to improve our understanding of the relationship between FDI and spillover effects. 
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 Appendix: The Olley-Pakes Method 
 
We attempt to correctly measure firm productivity by drawing on the framework for 
dynamic industry equilibrium analysis developed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Two salient 
features of the Olley-Pakes method are firm-specific productivity differences that exhibit 
idiosyncratic changes over time and the endogenous exit rule. These features allow us to 
address the endogeneity problem and the selection bias which afflicted production function 
estimates for a long time. To illustrate the insights of the Olley-Pakes method, we start with 
the following production function for firm i: 
i i i k 0 i ε βx k β β y + + + =                                            ( 1 )  
where  is gross output, is capital, and  is a vector of variable intermediate inputs such 
as labor and materials. All of the above variables are in logs. Firm-specific error term,  can 
be interpreted as technology, managerial ability, etc. The endogeneity problem arises by the 
fact that  is known by firm but not by the econometrician when making a choice of variable 
inputs. That is,  may be correlated with  . 
i y
ε





As the first step to address the endogeneity problem, Olley and Pakes (1996) consider 
the dynamic setting (introduce time t) and make the following assumption on  :  it ε
                                                           ( 2 )   it it it η ω ε + =
 
where  denotes “efficiency” (firm productivity) and  is a serially uncorrelated 
idiosyncratic shock. Olley and Pakes (1996) assume that   follows a first-order Markov 
process. That is, probability that  will realize depends “only” on  .  
it ω it η
it ω
1 it ω + it ω
The key innovation of the Olley-Pakes method is to proxy for the unobservable firm-specific 
productivity shock    by introducing an investment rule into the analysis. Olley and Pakes 
(1996) assume that capital accumulates following a deterministic rule: 
it ω
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 1 it 1 it it i δ)k (1 k − − + − = .                                                ( 3 )  
where   signifies the capital depreciation rate. Note that investment level is chosen in the 
“last” period, so that today’s capital does not react toη , today’s shock. For simplicity, we 
only discuss the solution to dynamic programming, a Markov Perfect Equilibrium strategy 
for firm’s choice of exit and investment.   
δ
it
At the beginning of the period t, the firm learns its productivity,  , which is 
assumed to evolve according to an exogenous Markov process.    For a sufficiently low value 
of  , a firm’s value of continuing in operation will be less than some (exogenous) 
liquidation value, and it will exit. We denote the threshold level at which a firm is indifferent 
between exiting and staying by 
it ω
it ω
t ω ~ . Thus, the optimal exit rule is: 
S t a y          i f   t it ω ~ ω ≥  
E x i t          o t h e r w i s e                                               ( 4 )  
 
The cut-off productivity  t ω ~ is assumed to be time-varying to capture the changing market 
structure in which the firms compete with each other. The investment rule is derived by 
solving the Bellman equation: 
) ω , (k i i it it t it = .                                                       ( 5 )  
The investment function is also assumed to be time-varying to reflect the changing 
competitive conditions that firms face in a given industry. Olley and Pakes (1996) show that 
under certain conditions that optimizing firms tend to have investment functions that are 
strictly increasing in the unobserved productivity shock,  . Since investment is strictly 
monotonic in  , we can invert the investment function to find out the efficiency  : 
it ω
it ω it ω
) i , (k h ω it it t it = .                                                       ( 6 )   
We take a two-stage approach for estimation. In the first stage, we estimate the following 
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 econometric equation to obtain estimates of the coefficients on the variable inputs    it x:
it it it t it it k 0 it η ) i , (k h βx k β β y + + + + =            
. η ) i , (k φ βx it it it t it + + =                                            ( 7 )  
The functional form of   is not known, and we estimate the partially linear regression 
model using a third-order polynomial in capital and investment to approximate the functional 
form of  . Since   controls for unobserved “efficiency”  , the error term in 
the production function    is no longer correlated with a firm’s choice of the variable inputs 
, and the estimated coefficient vector  is consistent.   
) ( φt ⋅
i , (k it it t
it η
) ( φt ⋅ ) φ it ω
it x β ˆ
We proceed with the second stage, where we estimate the coefficient on capital  . 
Since we have  , we need to estimate the following econometric equation: 
k β
it x β ˆ
it it it k 0 it it η ω k β β x β ˆ y + + + = − .                                         ( 8 )  
Using the Markov assumption, one can rewrite  as an unknown function of   to be 
estimated non-parametrically plus the innovation in ω denoted by   which  is 
uncorrelated with   by  definition. 
it ω 1 it ω −
it it ξ
it k
it 1 it it ξ ) g(ω ω + = −                                                    ( 9 )  
 
Since we now have an estimate of  it it t βx y   φ − = , which allows us to have an estimate of 
, the econometric equation becomes:  it k 0 it k 0 it k β β φ ) β , (β ω − − =
 
it it 1 it it k 0 it it η ξ ) g(ω k β β x β ˆ y + + + + = − −  
                it it 1 it k 0 1 t it k 0 η ξ ) k β β g(φ k β β + + − − + + = − −  
                it it 1 it k 1 t it k η ξ ) k β (φ g ~ k β + + − + = − −                      ( 1 0 )  
where ) k β (φ g ~
1 it k 1 t − − − subsumes the constant term,  .  0 β
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Yet, we still need to consider that we only observe those firms that select to stay in the 
industry. As we already have seen, the Olley-Pakes approach generates an exit rule, so that 
we can account for this self-selection and avoid the associated selection bias. Pavcnik (2002) 
shows that the expectation of future productivity conditional on a firm staying in the market 




+  in equation (4). Since we already know how to control for  , we only need to find a 
way to control for 
it ω
1 t ω ~
+ .  
We extract information about the cut-off productivity,  t ω ~ by evaluating the 
probability that a firm continues to operate at time t. We can model the probability of survival 
to period t as a function of capital and investment at time t-1 (see Pavcnik, 2002). We 
generate an estimate of the survival probability by running a probit regression on a third order 
polynomial in capital and investment (lagged by one period), and denote the estimated 
survival probability by  . Thus, the final estimation step is given by estimating   from 




it it 1 - t 1 it k 1 t it k it it η ξ ) P   , k β (φ g ~ k β x β ˆ y + + − + = − − − .                         ( 1 1 )  
 
As in Pavcnik (2002), we employ the nonlinear least squares technique, using a third-order 
polynomial in  and    to control for  1 it 1 it k 1 t ω k β φ − − − = − 1 - t P ˆ ) ( g ~ ⋅  where 
 








1 it k 1 t mj 1 - t 1 it k 1 t ∑∑
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123,634 120,720 120,322 124,722 133,285 143,564 203,418 196,844 
 
 






26,113 26,454 28,027 30,937 34,045 38,104 56,582 56,613
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable        Mean  Std.Dev.    Min      Max 
(1) ∆  output       0.062  0.620  -10.894    9.217 
(2) ∆  Labor       -0.010  0.416  -7.250    6.791 
(3) ∆  Material       0.059  0.625  -11.665  12.949 
(4) ∆  Capital       0.047  0.594  -11.785    9.445 
(5) ∆ Total factor productivity        0.009  0.522  -13.752 10.640 
(6) ∆  Foreign  firm  share          0.001  0.123  -6.771   6.771 
(7) ∆  Horizontal  presence        0.003  0.062  -0.909   0.942 
(8) ∆ Wholly owned firms’ horizontal presence    0.010  0.055  -0.934    0.898 
(9) ∆ Partially owned firms’ horizontal presence    -0.006    0.027  -0.567    0.322 
(10) ∆  Forward  linkages      0.001  0.034  -0.396    0.443 
(11) ∆  Backward  linkages        0.003  0.075  -1.196   1.298 
(12) ∆ Modernized local firms’ horizontal  linkages  0.056  0.069  -0.838   0.709 
(13) ∆  Modernized  local  firms’  forward  linkages         0.021 0.031  -0.453   0.523 
(14) ∆  Modernized  local  firms’  backward  linkages       0.017   0.054  -0.666   0.598 
(15)  Privately  owned  firms        0.236  0.425   0      1.000 
(16)  Incorporated  firms         0.167  0.373   0      1.000 
(17)  Collectives            0.203  0.402   0      1.000 




  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  15  16  17 18
1  1 . 0 0                      
2  0.25    1.00                    
3  0.59    0.22    1.00                   
4  0.15    0.14    0.13    1.00                
5  0.54    0.00    -0.35    -0.01  1.00                 
6  0.01    0.01    0.01    0.00  0.00    1.00                
7  0.00    -0.01    0.01    0.01  0.00    0.01    1.00             
8  0.00    0.00    0.00    0.01  0.00    0.00    0.90  1.00            
9  0.01  -0.01   0.01   0.01  0.00   0.00   0.44  0.00  1.00                  
10  0.00  -0.01  -0.01   0.00  0.01   0.00   0.30  0.26  0.16  1.00                
11  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00  0.00   0.00   0.18  0.20  0.00  -0.20  1.00              
12  0.01  -0.02   0.01   0.01  0.00   0.00  -0.47  -0.48  -0.08  -0.10  -0.11  1.00            
13  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00   0.00  -0.03  -0.06  0.05  0.01  -0.08  0.11  1.00          
14  0.01   0.00   0.00   0.00  0.00   0.00  -0.11  -0.06  -0.13  -0.23  0.62  0.14  0.02  1.00          
15  0.05   0.04   0.05   0.06  0.01  -0.01  -0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.01  -0.05  -0.08  -0.02   1.00        
16  0.01  -0.01   0.01   0.01  0.00  -0.01   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.01  -0.25   1.00      
17  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.01   0.02  0.00  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.07  0.08  0.04  -0.28  -0.23   1.00  
18  0.01   0.05   0.01  -0.02  0.00   0.03   0.00  0.02  -0.04  0.00  0.01  -0.05  0.01  -0.02  -0.32  -0.26  -0.29  1.00 
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 Table 2 Results from OLS Regressions in First Differences (∆ ln firm output is a dependent variable) 
 
         Whole  period 1998-2001 2002-2005
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No.  of  observations 391,564 391,564 391,564 391,564 115,081 115,081 276,483 276,483
R-squared 
 
0.361 0.362 0.362 0.362 0.325 0.325 0.378 0.378
             
                   
                 
[Note] ∆ ln labor, ∆ ln capital, ∆ materials, 3-digit SIC industry, area, and year fixed effects are not shown 
            ***: P<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, +: p<0.10 
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 Table 3 Results from Olley-Pakes Regressions (∆ ln total factor productivity is a dependent variable) 
 
         Whole  period 1998-2001 2002-2005


















































































































































































No.  of  observations 390,648 390,648 390,648 390,648 114,479 114,479 276,179 276,179
R-squared 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
             
                   
                 
[Note] 3-digit SIC industry, area, and year fixed effects are not shown 
            ***: P<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, +: p<0.10 
33 
 Table 4 Results from OLS Regressions in First Differences (∆ ln firm output is a dependent variable) – including both local and foreign firms 
 
         Whole  period 1998-2001 2002-2005






















































































































































































































No.  of  observations 513,858 513,858 513,858 513,858 146,917 146,917 366,941 366,941
R-squared  0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.336 0.336 0.389 0.389
             
       
                   
                 




        
Table 5 Results from Olley-Pakes Regressions (∆ ln total factor productivity is a dependent variable) – including both local and foreign firms 
 
Whole  period 1998-2001 2002-2005
              Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)




































Wholly owned (∆) 
 

















































































































































































                    No.  of  observations 514,646 514,646 514,646 514,646 146,876 146,876 367,770 367,770
                  R-squared  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
[Note] 3-digit SIC industry, area, and year fixed effects are not shown.    ***: P<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, +: p<0.10 